Financial Equality in Marriage and Parenthood: Sharing the Burdens as Well as the Benefits by Dover, Agnes Pek
Catholic University Law Review 
Volume 29 
Issue 3 Spring 1980 Article 11 
1980 
Financial Equality in Marriage and Parenthood: Sharing the 
Burdens as Well as the Benefits 
Agnes Pek Dover 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
Agnes P. Dover, Financial Equality in Marriage and Parenthood: Sharing the Burdens as Well as the 
Benefits, 29 Cath. U. L. Rev. 733 (1980). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview/vol29/iss3/11 
This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by CUA Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Catholic University Law Review by an authorized editor of CUA Law Scholarship Repository. For more 
information, please contact edinger@law.edu. 
FINANCIAL EQUALITY IN MARRIAGE AND
PARENTHOOD: SHARING THE
BURDENS AS WELL AS THE
BENEFITS
Gradual judicial rejection of years of socially accepted sex discrimina-
tion has enabled women to increase dramatically their economic indepen-
dence both within and without the home.' Historically, courts have been
reluctant to impose financial responsibilities on women. On the premise
that women were innately less competent to function independently in the
business world, courts excluded women from certain male-dominated pro-
fessions2 as well as from specific civic3 and employment-related4 obliga-
tions borne by men. Judicial reluctance to require women to assume
duties formerly performed by men alone has also colored domestic rela-
tions law. Traditionally, the burdens of alimony5 and spousal support6
1. A number of classifications based on sex have been declared unconstitutional under
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl.
4. Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977) (Social Security survivors' benefits for widows
only and not widowers regardless of dependency); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976)
(lower drinking age permitted for women than for men); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7
(1975) (parental support for sons, but not daughters, required until the age of 21); Wein-
berger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975) (Social Security benefits provided to children of
surviving female but not male spouse); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (pre-
sumption of dependency of spouses of married men in the military but not of married wo-
men); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (state preference for males over females as estate
administrators).
2. See, e.g., Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948) (tending bar); Bradwell v. Illinois,
83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872) (practicing law).
3. See, e.g., Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961) (women exempted from jury service).
But see Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979) (Missouri statute allowing women an auto-
matic exclusion from jury service upon request violates the "fair cross section" requirement
of the sixth amendment). See Johnston & Knapp, Sex Discrimination by Law: .4 Study in
Judicial Perspective, 46 N.Y.U.L. REV. 675, 708-21 (1971), for a discussion of the develop-
ment of the jury service duty for women.
4. See Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (Oregon statute precluding women from
working more than 10 hours a day upheld).
5. See, e.g., Stern v. Stem, 165 Conn. 190, 332 A.2d 78 (1973); Jacobs v. Jacobs, 50 So.
2d 169 (Fla. 1951); Hedderick v. Hedderick, 163 Pa. Super. Ct. 564, 63 A.2d 373 (1949). See
also 2 W. NELSON, ON DIVORCE AND ANNULMENT § 14.06 (2d ed. 1961). Some states,
however, have enacted sex-neutral alimony statutes. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
3105.18 (Supp. 1978). See also Kontner v. Kontner, 103 Ohio App. 310, 139 N.E.2d 366
(1966) (alimony award to husband conditioned on clear showing that he is in need);
Rainburg v. Rainburg, 80 Ohio App. 303, 75 N.E.2d 481 (1946) (alimony award to husband
permissible if divorce is obtained by husband for his wife's aggression).
6. See F. KUCHLER, LAW OF ENGAGEMENT AND MARRIAGE 15 (2d ed. 1978).
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after divorce or separation have fallen upon men, alone, while mothers
have generally been exempted from the duty of providing financial sup-
port for their children7 during and after marriage.
Assumptions that women function in society primarily as homemakers
and mothers underlie many states' alimony and child support statutes. Re-
cent case developments in domestic relations, however, challenge the
states' reliance on these assumptions.8 Under the fourteenth amendment
equal protection clause, the Supreme Court has prevented states from de-
priving one sex of benefits granted the other unless it can demonstrate that
the sex differentiation is reasonably related to a legitimate state interest. 9
Most recently, the Supreme Court has applied this equal protection stan-
dard to strike down a state statute requiring only men to pay alimony.' °
Simultaneously, lower courts are in the process of reconsidering the tradi-
tional allocation of financial responsibility in spousal" and child support ' 2
decrees. This Note will consider cases indicating a movement toward
more equitable division of male and female domestic responsibilities to
identify legal relationships which may be altered to conform with the
emerging principle under the fourteenth amendment of equalizing obliga-
tions during and after marriage.
I. DOMESTIC RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES: AN HISTORICAL
OVERVIEW
Courts have traditionally regarded married women as unable to control
and manage property.'3 Under the principle of coverture at common
7. See, e.g., Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973); Brock v. Brock, 281 Ala. 525, 205 So.
2d 903 (Ala. 1967); Schneider v. Schneider, 188 Neb. 80, 195 N.W.2d 227 (Neb. 1972). Con-
tra, Addy v. Addy, 240 Iowa 255, 36 N.W.2d 352 (1949).
8. See notes 67-87 and accompanying text infra.
9. The Supreme Court first applied the fourteenth amendment's equal protection stan-
dard to strike down sex discrimination in Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). In that case, the
Court struck down an Idaho statute giving preference to men over women in appointments
as administrators of decendents' estates. Following Reed, the Court continued to erect con-
stitutional barriers to sex discrimination in a series of challenges to both state and federal
legislation. See, e.g., Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977) (Social Security survivors'
benefits allowed regardless of dependency to widows but not to widowers violates fourteenth
amendment); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975) (parental support for sons until the age
of 21 but not for daughters violates fourteenth amendment).
10. Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979).
11. See Coleman v. Maryland, 37 Md. App. 322, 377 A.2d 553 (1977). See also notes
69-71 and accompanying text infra.
12. See Plant v. Plant, 20 111. App. 3d 5, 312 N.E.2d 847 (1974). See also note 106 infra.
13. See Weitzman, Legal Regulation of Marriage: Tradition and Change, 62 CALIF. L.
REV. 1169, 1180-87 (1974).
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law, 14 women were denied the ability to hold property, and their husbands
were given sole control over the family assets. Coverture thus shielded
married women from the financial responsibilities of spousal and child
support, while it gave men both the benefits and burdens associated with
holding property. 5 Courts observed this common law duty of the husband
to support his wife during marriage' 6 regardless of the wife's previous
financial standing or vocational ability.' 7 In contrast, courts recognized
domestic household functions and care of children as duties uniquely be-
longing to women.'" A husband was held responsible for purchases made
in fulfillment of his wife's household duties because she could not fulfill
these responsibilities without financial support from him. 1'
This judicial characterization of women as financially dependent ex-
tended beyond marriage through separation, divorce, and widowhood. Al-
imony, the allowance a divorced husband is required to make for the
support and maintenance of his former wife, derived from the husband's
common law obligation of spousal support.2" Through alimony statutes,
states sought to prevent women from becoming public charges once they
14. The term coverture "implies that ... [the wife] is ... under the protection of her
husband, and the common law will not allow her to do anything which may prejudice her
rights or interests, without his advice, consent and approval. In this respect, she is incapable
of acting alone." Osborn v. Horine, 19 Ill. 123, 125 (1857). Commentators have often
viewed the doctrine of coverture as based on a "fiction that husband and wife had a single
identity - that of the husband." Weitzman, supra note 13, at 1173.
15. See F. KUCHLER, supra note 6.
16. Id
17. A husband could not be relieved of the liability to support his wife despite ex-
traordinary circumstances. See, e.g., Churchward v. Churchward, 132 Conn. 72, 42 A.2d
659 (1972) (wife's independent wealth will not relieve husband of his support obligation).
See also Kershner v. Kershner, 244 App. Div. 34, 278 N.Y.S. 501 (1935), a'd, 269 N.Y. 655,
200 N.E. 43 (1936) (wife's prenuptial agreement to surrender temporary support rights void
as against public policy). See also Note, The Economics of Divorce: Alimony and Property
Awards, 43 U. CIN. L. REV. 133 (1974).
18. In King v. King, 246 Miss. 798, 152 So. 2d 889 (1963), for example, the court noted
that a husband's support for his wife may be contingent upon discharge of household duties
imposed upon her by the marriage contract. Courts often barred women from most occupa-
tions on the theory that employment outside of the home might interfere with a woman's
duty to maintain the household and care for the children. See Weitzman, supra note 13, at
1187.
19. See, e.g., Saks & Co. v. Bennett, 12 N.J. Super. 316, 79 A.2d 479 (1951).
20. Alimony is defined in Hedderick v. Hedderick, 163 Pa. Super. Ct. 564, 63 A.2d 373,
375 (1949), as "an extension or prolongation of the legal obligation to support beyond the
period of the existence of the marital status."
The conduct of the parties has been an important consideration for divorce courts award-
ing alimony. Although alimony was a continuation of the husband's duty to support his
wife, many jurisdictions precluded her from receiving alimony if the dissolution of the mar-
riage was primarily due to the wife's conduct. This "fault" criteria also worked as a penalty
to some exhusbands by requiring men who were at fault to pay high alimony amounts re-
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were removed from the protective shelter of their husbands' income.21
These considerations also persuaded courts to assign the child support
obligation to fathers.22 Just as wives were free of the burden of paying
alimony to financially dependent exhusbands, so mothers were generally
relieved of the duty of providing financial support for their children, both
during and after marriage. 23 In many jurisdictions, the father had exclu-
sive responsibility for child support, 4 while in others, the mother was lia-
ble only in the event of the father's death or incapacity.25 Courts usually
assumed that most mothers could not acquire assets on their own in order
to support their children.26
In the early 1970's, however, courts began to reconsider states' conferral
of alimony and child support benefits solely on the woman. This trend
reflected an increased availability of educational and career opportunities
for women. The change in court decisions has been slow, however, partly
because new opportunities for women have not radically changed the eco-
nomic inequality between the sexes. Nonetheless, many women are now
acquiring assets during marriage and establishing financial independence
prior to separation or divorce. 27 This trend has stimulated an increase in
the divorce rate,28 which has in turn resulted in a greater number of wo-
men turning to the job market for fulfillment of personal as well as
gardless of their wives' actual needs. See Note, supra note 17, at 143. In no case, however,
would a "guilty" wife be required to support her exhusband.
21. See Coleman v. Maryland, 37 Md. App. 322, 325, 377 A.2d 553, 555 (1977), for a
discussion of the historical origins of alimony.
22. See Ruhsam v. Ruhsam, 21 Ariz. App. 101, 515 P.2d 1199, 1202 (1973). See also W.
BROCKELBANK, INTERSTATE ENFORCEMENT OF FAMILY SUPPORT (1960); F. KUCHLER,
LAW OF ENGAGEMENT AND MARRIAGE (2d ed. 1978); Foster, Dependent Children and the
Law, 18 U. PITT. L. REV. 579 (1957).
23. See Ohio v. Oppenheimer, 46 Ohio App. 2d 241, 348 N.E.2d 731, 736 (1975), for a
discussion of earlier cases which set forth the traditional view that the father has the primary
duty for minor children.
24. See Kurtz, The State Equal Rights Amendments and Their Impact on Domestic Rela-
tions Law, 11 FAM. L.Q. 101, 145 (1977).
25. ld
26. See Weitzman, supra note 13, at 1181.
27. The percentage of women in the work force has grown from 18% in 1890 to 50% in
1978. Approximately 50% of all married women are now in the labor force. THE SUBTLE
REVOLUTION: WOMEN AT WORK 3 (R. Smith ed. 1979).
28. The divorce rate increased from 2.2 per 1,000 population in 1960 to 5.1 per 1,000 in
1978. The actual number of divorces in 1978 (1.1 million) was one-half the number of mar-
riages. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, SERIES P-23, No. 84, DIVORCE,
CHILD CUSTODY AND CHILD SUPPORT i (1979). See generally C. BIRD, THE Two-
PAYCHECK MARRIAGE (1979); ABA FAMILY LAW SECTION, ECONOMICS OF DIVORCE, A
COLLECTION OF PAPERS (1978) [hereinafter cited as ECONOMICS OF DIVORCE]; U.S. BUREAU
OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL. No. 1880, U.S. WORKING WOMEN (1975).
Recent studies indicate that, with every $1,000 increase in her salary, a woman's chances
of divorce increase by two percent. See C. BIRD, supra at 28. The increase in divorce rates
[Vol. 29:733
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financial objectives. These social and economic changes should be consid-
ered by courts in confronting domestic relations issues.
A. Constitutional Precursors to Domestic Independence for Women
The United States Supreme Court recognized the growing independence
of women and their changing role in society29 when women began raising
gender discrimination claims under the equal protection clause of the four-
teenth amendment.3" Unlike race discrimination, 3' discrimination against
women did not receive vigorous judicial analysis under the fourteenth
ameidment until 1971. Formerly, a state could grant benefits or confer
obligations on one sex but not the other if the classification was rationally
related to some legitimate state interest.32 Under this scheme, gender clas-
sifications were invariably upheld. 33 In Reed v. Reed,34 however, the
is also partly attributable to a relaxation of the legal prerequisites to obtaining a divorce. In
addition to the traditional fault-based factors by which a spouse may successfully obtain a
divorce, see note 20 supra, a judicial determination that the marriage had irretrievably bro-
ken down became sufficient grounds for divorce in some states. See Freed & Foster, Divorce
in the Fifty States. An Overview as of August 1, 1979, [1979] 5 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 4027.
With the advent of these "no-fault" divorce statutes, the criteria for divorce shifted to factors
such as extended periods of separation and irreconcilable differences between the spouses.
In many states, the individual conduct of one party has become irrelevant in awarding ali-
mony and dividing property. See Note, supra note 17, at 133-34. See, e.g., Green & Long,
The Real and Illusory Changes of the 1977 Marriage and Divorce Act, 27 CATH. U.L. REV.
469 (1978) (1977 amendments to D.C. Code eliminated fault as gounds for absolute divorce).
29. The Supreme Court implicitly recognized changing familial roles in Stanley v. Illi-
nois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (presumption that unwed mother, but not unwed father, had a
right to custody after the death of one parent is invalid) and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973) (woman has a right to choose to have an abortion).
30. See Ginsburg, Sex Equality and the Constitution, 52 TUL. L. REV. 451 (1978).
3 1. Under the Court's formula of "strict scrutiny," race was identified as a suspect class
which a state may treat differentially only to promote a compelling state interest. See Kore-
matsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). Other classifications, such as wealth, need only
be rationally related to a legitimate state interest in order to be held constitutionally valid.
See San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28-29 (1973). See also Gins-
burg, supra note 30, at 468.
32. The Court had adopted an approach of "minimal scrutiny" in considering the rela-
tionship of sex-based classifications to state interests. Under this standard, a state could
discriminate on the basis of sex if its classification was rationally related to a legitimate
state interest. See, e.g., Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948) (exclusion of women from
tending bar not violative of equal protection); Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130
(1872) (exclusion of women from admission to the bar not violative of equal protection).
33. See Emden, Intermediate Tier Analysis of Sex Discrimination Cases: Legal Perpetua-
tion of Traditional Myths, 43 ALB. L. REV. 73 (1978); Gunther, Foreword- In Search of
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court.- 4 Modelfor a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L.
REV. (1972); Johnston & Knapp, supra note 3; Comment, Constitutional Law: Equal Protec-
tion - Gender Discrimination - Calfano v. Goldfarb, 23 N.Y.L.S.L. REV. 503 (1978); Com-
ment, Constitutional Law: Equal Protection Challenges to Gender-Based Classifications Evoke
Varied Court Responses, 17 WASHBURN L.J. (1977); Note, Equal Protection. Modes ofAnaly-
sis in the Burger Court, 53 DEN. L.J. 687 (1976).
34. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
19801
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Supreme Court for the first time required that a state have a substantial
interest to protect in drawing its gender-based classification. In this case,
an Idaho statute giving preference to men over equally qualified women in
selecting administrators for decedents' estates was held to violate the equal
protection clause.35 The Court modified its "minimum rationality" stan-
dard to require further that any gender-based discrimination be reason-
ably related to the achievement of an important governmental objective.36
The Court, therefore, rejected Idaho's contention that the administrative
convenience of automatically selecting males as estate administrators was
an important governmental interest justifying the use of sex classifica-
31tions.
Despite its willingness to grant women benefits on equal protection
grounds, the Supreme Court hesitated to grant women affirmative duties
and financial responsibilities. In Kahn v. Shevin,38 for example, the Court
upheld a paternalistic statute because it compensated women for economic
hardships they had suffered as a disadvantaged class.39 Kahn involved a
Florida statute granting widows, but not widowers, a property tax exemp-
tion. By endorsing such benign discrimination, the Court apparently pre-
sumed that a widow could not assume her husband's duties and that she
therefore needed preferential tax treatment."n
Congressional efforts to ease the presumed burdens of the working
world on women have been consistent with the states' concerns in drafting
paternalistic statutes. In the military, for example, Congress devised a pol-
icy for promoting naval officers that was more lenient for women than for
men.4 ' Under this unbalanced promotion policy, female naval officers
were allowed four more years of service than male officers to achieve a
35. Id at 76.
36. Id at 75-76. A plurality of the Court carried this formula a step further in Fron-
tiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), by applying the test of strict scrutiny to gender
discrimination. While a majority of the Justices agreed that the sex-based benefit system in
question was unconstitutional, only four of the Justices held sex to be a suspect class. Id at
682-91. After Frontiero, a standard less rigorous than strict scrutiny evolved for gender dis-
crimination. See generally Comment, Gender-Based Discrimination and a Developing Stan-
dard of Equal Protection Analysis, 46 U. CIN. L. REV. 572, 574-76 (1977).
37. 404 U.S. at 76. See Erickson, Kahn, Ballard, and Wiesenfeld A New Equal Protec-
tion Test in "Reverse" Sex Discrimination Cases', 42 BROOKLYN L. REV. I (1975).
38. 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
39. Id
40. The Florida legislature also offered the exemption to the blind and disabled. Id at
352 n.2.
41. Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975).
[Vol. 29:733
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minimum promotion level before being mandatorily discharged.42 In re-
viewing this policy in Schlesinger v. Ballard,43 the Supreme Court found
that Congress had reasonably concluded that female officers in the Navy
had less opportunity for promotion than male officers. Under this benign
discrimination rationale, the Court considered the more lenient policy for
women a fair remedial step toward bringing women to parity in employ-
ment and it held the discriminatory policy constitutionally sound."
The Court again considered the validity of a congressionally mandated
preferential policy based on sex in Califano v. Webster.45 In that case, the
plaintiff challenged a federal statute calculating social security benefits on
the basis of sex. Under the statutory formula, women applying for social
security retirement benefits computed their average wage, which formed
the basis of the benefit-level computation, by eliminating eight of their.low
wage-earning years. Similarly situated men, however, were allowed to de-
duct only five low wage-earning years from their averages.46 In upholding
the preferential system, the Court recognized the reduction of the eco-
nomic disparity between men and women as an important governmental
objective.47 Although the statute was found to discriminate on the basis of
sex, the form of discrimination was considered benign because the legisla-
tive classification served to advance the economic position of women as a
class historically recognized as underprivileged.4" The Court thus implic-
itly acknowledged that the government may utilize gender-based classifica-
tions to cushion the financial difficulties that women might face on their
own even though such classifications may reinforce sexual stereotypes.49
42. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 6382, 6401(a) (1976).
43. 419 U.S. 498 (1975).
44. Id. at 508.
45. 430 U.S. 313 (1977).
46. Id
47. 430 U.S. at 318. The formula for calculating Social Security benefits was based on
the statistically accurate assumption that the average annual wage of women was lower than
the average wage of men. See Note, Social Security.- Sex Discrimination and Equal Protec-
tion, 30 BAYLOR L. REV: 199, 201 (1978). For statistics comparing the average wages of
women with the average wages of men, see THE SUBTLE REVOLUTION: WOMEN AT WORK,
supra note 27, at 31-36.
48. 430 U.S. at 317-18. See generally Note, Fih Amendment Protection Against Gender-
Based Discrimination in the Distribution of Survivors' Ben§its. Calfano v. Goldfarb, 31 Sw.
L.J. 1156 (1977).
49. See Erickson, supra note 37, at 18 (benign discrimination encourages people "to
maintain the attitude that women are weaker or less able or should have different society
roles than men").
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B. Application of the Constitutional Analysis to Domestic Rights and
Responsibilities
Lower courts considering domestic relations questions were, until re-
cently, guided by the benign discrimination posture adopted by the
Supreme Court in Kahn, Ballard, and Webster. Faced with constitutional
challenges to alimony and child support statutes discriminating in favor of
women, these courts reaffirmed the Supreme Court's view that women
needed special protection from the economic burdens of maintaining a
family because of their general inability to provide for financial support.5 °
In Stern v. Stern,5' the Connecticut Supreme Court rejected a husband's
claim that a state statute imposing the duty of alimony pendente lite52 ex-
clusively on men violated the equal protection clause. According to the
court, the state legislature properly considered popular preconceptions
concerning the distribution of duties between husband and wife in articu-
lating its legislative purpose." The court cited the equal protection stan-
dard established in Reed v. Reed 4 for the proposition that arbitrary sex-
based discrimination is invalid. It held, however, that the sex-based dis-
crimination of the Connecticut alimony law was not arbitrary because the
legislature could "properly make judgments about family life" reflecting
the traditional view that men, but not women, are responsible for spousal
support."
On similar facts, the Georgia Supreme Court, in Murphy v. Murphy, 6
relied heavily on Kahn v. Shevin" to uphold a divorce statute imposing an
exclusively male alimony duty. The court analogized the difficulties wo-
men encounter at the death of their husbands to those confronted at di-
vorce and held that divorcees need protection from the onus of paying
alimony.58 Implicit in the court's reasoning was the assumption that it is
generally the exwife who is the spouse more in need of financial support
upon divorce. Thus, according to that court, a state policy exempting di-
vorced women from the duty to pay alimony was a reasonable means to
50. Butsee Doyle v. Doyle, 5 Misc. 2d 4, 158 N.Y.S.2d 909, 912 (Sup. Ct. 1957) ("Why
should ex-wives and separated women seek a preferred status in which they shall toil not,
neither shall they spin.[sic]").
51. 165 Conn. 190, 332 A.2d 78 (1973).
52. Alimony pendente lite is temporary alimony, generally awarded while the divorce
proceedings are pending. It may be awarded to a dependent spouse to cover general needs
or court costs and attorney's fees. See Kurtz, supra note 24, at 131-32.
53. 165 Conn. 190, 332 A.2d 78, 82 (1973).
54. 404 U.S. 71 (1971). See notes 34-37 and accompanying text supra.
55. 165 Conn. at 198, 332 A.2d at 82.
56. 232 Ga. 352, 206 S.E.2d 458 (1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 929 (1976).
57. 416 U.S. 351 (1974). See notes 38-40 and accompanying text supra.
58. 232 Ga. at 353, 206 S.E.2d at 459.
[Vol. 29:733
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alleviate the burdens that women face upon separation from their hus-
bands.
Courts have upheld similar sex-based child support laws for the same
reasons they advanced to justify alimony awards. In Dill v. Dill,59 for ex-
ample, the Georgia Supreme Court upheld a statute making fathers prima-
rily liable for their children's support. The statute required mothers to
provide support only upon the death, desertion, or incapacity of the fa-
ther.6" Wanlyn Dill had sought enforcement of a support decree against
her former husband through the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Sup-
port Act6 ' which had been adopted in part by that state's legislature. Her
husband, however, argued that the portion of the Act making men prima-
rily liable for child support was a violation of the equal protection clause.
In a brief opinion, the court dismissed the father's claims, citing the natu-
ral, physical, social, and economic differences between the sexes as justifi-
cation for the differential treatment.62 The Colorado Supreme Court
upheld a similar sex-based system of parental rights and responsibilities in
People v. Elliott.63 The court examined a Colorado statute under the fed-
eral equal protection clause and concluded that the allocation of child sup-
port obligation solely to the male parent reflected a reasonable and
accurate conclusion that men, because of their social and economic status,
were in a better position to provide support for their children.64
Both the child support and earlier alimony decisions reflect a presump-
tion which may in many cases be accurate: women are less able than men
to provide financial support for their families. These sex-based policies
may have been designed to allocate financial support to the spouse most in
need and to remedy the effects of past discrimination. The benign pur-
poses of these policies are losing validity, however, as principles of sexual
equality are slowly being translated into greater economic independence
for women.65 To the extent that these policies do not change to reflect the
59. 232 Ga. 231, 206 S.E.2d 6 (1974).
60. Id. at 231-32, 206 S.E.2d at 7.
61. Portions of the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act relating to enforce-
ment of out-of-state support decrees have been incorporated into the Code of Georgia. GA.
CODE ANN. § 99-903a(6[a-b]) (1976).
62. 232 Ga. at 233, 206 S.E.2d at 7.
63. 186 Colo. 65, 525 P.2d 457 (1974).
64. Id at 71, 525 P.2d at 457. The Colorado statute has since been amended to equalize
child support responsibilities between both parents. Id at 69, 525 P.2d at 459, See also
Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973) (fathers have sole obligation for support of their chil-
dren whether legitimate or illegitimate); Wright v. Standard Oil Co., 319 F. Supp. 1364
(N.D. Miss. 1970) (since father is primarily liable for child support, he alone has right of
action to recover losses for injuries inflicted on child).
65. One commentator believes that the financial responsibility that family support stat-
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changing economic status of women, they will perpetuate the stereotypic
notion of women as the dependent sex. Additionally, since a woman's
financial needs and capabilities can be individually determined in a judi-
cial hearing, generalizations enforced by the above cases seem increasingly
unfair.66
II. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: COLEMAN, PFOHL AND ORR
Some courts have begun to recognize the inadequacies of sexual stereo-
types as relevant factors in determining familial responsibilities.67 State
equal rights amendments 68 (ERA's) provide a convenient framework for
such courts to overturn sex-based classifications in family law. In Coleman
v. Maryland,69 for example, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals inter-
preted the state ERA as a bar to sex distinctions in assessing spousal sup-
port.70 The court reversed the conviction of Lewis Coleman for desertion
and nonsupport of his wife. The reversal was based on a finding that
Maryland's desertion and nonsupport statute, which was applicable only
to husbands, was unconstitutional under the state's ERA. According to the
court, Maryland's ERA accurately reflects changing attitudes about family
life in contrast to the traditional male-only support statutes reflecting the
nineteenth-century notion that only husbands should pay support.7
Although only seventeen states are armed with ERA's to strike down
sex-based support and alimony statutes, 72 over forty states have divorce
utes place on men is a major source of male authority and power. Continually placing these
responsibilities on men, therefore, precludes women from expanding their authority and
power and, in fact, reinforces their domesticity and dependency. See Weitzman, supra note
13, at 1182, 1197.
66. See Kurtz, supra note 24, at 133.
67. See, e.g., Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979); Pfohl v. Pfohl, 345 So. 2d 371 (Fla. 1977);
Plant v. Plant, 20 Ill. App. 3d 5, 312 N.E.2d 847 (1974).
68. As of 1979, 17 states had enacted Equal Rights Amendments to their state constitu-
tions barring discrimination on the basis of sex. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 3; COLO. CONST.
art. II, § 29; CONN. CONST. art. I, § 20; HAWAII CONST. art. I, §§ 4, 21; ILL. CONST. art. I, §
18; LA. CONST. art. I, § 3; MD. CONST. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS art. 46; MASS. CONST.
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS art. I; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 4; N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 2; N.M.
CONST. art. II, § 18; PA. CONST. art. I, § 28; TEX. CONST. art I, § 3a; UTAH CONST. art IV, §
1; VA. CONST. art. I, § 11; WASH. CONST. art. XXXI, § 1; WYo. CONST. art. I, § 3. See
Kurtz, supra note 24, at 101-02.
69. 37 Md. App. 322, 377 A.2d 553 (1977).
70. See also Rand v. Rand, 280 Md. 508, 374 A.2d 900 (1977) (sex-based child support
statute invalidated on the basis of Maryland ERA); Henderson v. Henderson, 458 Pa. 97,
327 A.2d 60 (1974) (security deposit requirement applicable to men only invalidated on the
basis of Pennsylvania ERA statute).
71. 37 Md. App. at 326, 377 A.2d at 556.
72. See Kurtz, supra note 24, at 101.
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statutes specifically allowing alimony to be awarded to either party.7 3
These sex-neutral statutes are as effective as the state ERA's in equalizing
the treatment of husbands and wives with regard to alimony. The Florida
state legislature, for example, specifically amended its divorce statute to
allow an alimony award to either party."4 In Pfohl v. Pfohl,75 the District
Court of Appeals of Florida applied the state statute to require that the
wife pay both lump sum and rehabilitative alimony to her husband. In
Pfohl the husband, formerly a toy salesman, had stopped working at the
request of his wife, whose personal accumulated wealth was over four mil-
lion dollars. The court noted that the statute "is in keeping with the cur-
rent social trend toward establishing a more equitable relationship
between the sexes,"" and that the standards previously used to determine
how much alimony the wife should receive would now apply equally to
husbands seeking alimony.77
Coleman, Pfohl, and similar cases left unanswered the question of
whether sex-based support provisions are permissible in the absence of a
state ERA or other sex-neutral statute; that is, whether a sex-based support
statute can withstand equal protection scrutiny. In Orr v. Orr7 8 the
Supreme Court decided the question in the negative. The plaintiff had
instituted contempt proceedings against her former husband, alleging his
failure to make alimony payments. Her husband asserted that the Ala-
bama statute requiring husbands but not wives to pay alimony was uncon-
stitutional under the fourteenth amendment.79 The Alabama Court of
Civil Appeals affirmed the lower court's decision upholding the statute.80
Relying on Murphy v. Murphy,8" the court concluded that the state legisla-
73. See ECONOMICS OF DIVORCE, supra note 28; Freed & Foster, supra note 28, at
4033. The state statutes still allowing alimony to women only are: IDAHO CODE §§ 32-704,
32-706 (1947); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW art. 13, § 236 (1964); WYo. STAT. § 20-2-114 (1977).
But see Thaler v. Thaler, 89 Misc. 2d 315, 391 N.Y.S.2d 331 (Sup. Ct. 1977) (New York's
female-only alimony statute violates the equal protection clause; court has power to award
alimony to men as well).
74. See FLA. STAT. § 61.08 (1975). See also Cypen, Irving & Stephen, Alimonyfor Hus-
bands.- Is There True Equality?, 52 FLA. BAR J. 201 (1978).
75. 345 So. 2d 371 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
76. Id. at 376.
77. Id
78. 440 U.S. 268 (1979).
79. Because husband William Orr had not requested alimony for himself, a question of
his standing to sue arose. According to the dissent, the justiciability issue relieved the Court
from considering the substantive constitutional question. 440 U.S. at 290-300 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
80. 351 So. 2d 904 (Ala. Civ. App. 1977), rey'd, 440 U.S. 268 (1979).
81. 232 Ga. 352, 206 S.E.2d 458 (1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 929 (1975). See text
accompanying notes 56-58 supra.
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ture could reasonably decide that the female partner of a broken marriage
needs the financial assistance that the alimony exemption provides.82 The
Alabama Supreme Court denied certiorari although a strong dissent criti-
cized the protectionist alimony statute as perpetuating, rather than allevi-
ating, discriminatory practices.
83
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the Alabama decision
was reversed. Speaking for the majority, Justice Brennan reiterated the
equal protection standard for gender-based discrimination. 4 The Court
emphasized that any protectionist practice must actually further the legis-
lature's articulated goal of bringing needy women to parity.85 The Ala-
bama statute, however, did not accomplish this purpose since it applied to
both wealthy and needy women. The Court rejected the argument that
exempting women from the obligation of alimony indicated "the State's
preference for an allocation of family responsibilities under which the wife
plays a dependent role."86 The Court thus reaffirmed its earlier standard
enunciated in Reed that promotion of a male-dominated family is not a
legitimate state goal justifying use of a sex-based classification.87
III. THE NEWLY EMERGING RESPONSIBILITIES OF WIVES AND
MOTHERS
The recent judicial tendency to eliminate sex as a factor in determining
which party should provide support for the family is justifiable in light of
the availability of individualized hearings at which each party's needs and
abilities can be ascertained.88 In Kahn, there was no method readily avail-
able to determine an individual widow's need for the property tax exemp-
82. 351 So. 2d at 905.
83. Justice Jones, criticizing the sex-based alimony statute, considered unfounded the
generalization that all women are economically disadvantaged after divorce. He further
noted that the statute "perpetuates the misguided conception that women are not legally
equal to men." Id at 906, 909 (Jones, J., dissenting).
84. 440 U.S. 268, 279 (1979).
85. Id at 280-81. The Court's reasoning follows the test set forth in Califano v. Gold-
farb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977), and Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975), that a statute
intended to remedy the economic disadvantages historically experienced by women must
actually further that objective before it can withstand constitutional scrutiny. See Erickson,
supra note 37, at 36. By this standard, attempts to achieve state interests through gender-
based classifications will be subjected to "a careful analysis of whether the means used sub-
stantially relate to achieving the desired objective." Comment, supra note 36, at 578.
86. 440 U.S. 1 at 279.
87. See notes 34-37 and accompanying text supra.
88. See Cypen, Irving & Stephen, supra note 74, at 203; Comment, Child Support.- His,
Her, or Their Responsibility?, 25 DEPAUL L. REV. 707 (1976); Note, The Implied Partnership:
Equitable Alternative to Contemporary Methods of Postmarital Property Distribution, 26 U.
FLA. L. REV. 221 (1974).
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tion. Thus, wealthy widows received the special tax treatment along with
financially dependent widows who were the intended beneficiaries of the
remedial legislation. 9 When alimony and child support are at issue, how-
ever, property settlement proceedings and child support hearings can read-
ily determine the need for relief on a case-by-case basis. 90 Thus, alimony
and child support proceedings offer a setting for the full development of a
sex-neutral approach to the imposition of familial responsibilities.
Justice Brennan stressed the importance of these individualized determi-
nations in Orr. He pointed out that because courts provide hearings at
which the parties' comparative financial needs and abilities are considered,
there is no need for courts to assume that all wives are financially depen-
dent and all husbands are not.9 The Supreme Court in Orr refused to
apply the Kahn generalizations about wage-earning and support ability to
alimony. The Court suggested that, if a state wishes to assist financially
needy spouses, it may not predetermine a spouse's need by imposing sex-
based classifications. 92 Thus, after Orr, it is clear that the sex-neutral
equal protection standard requires the responsibility for spousal support to
be assessed on some basis other than sex.93
State constitutional amendments have also been instrumental in pro-
moting need as a basis for alimony and spousal support determinations.
The Coleman court, for example, used the sex-neutral approach of the
state's ERA in invalidating Maryland's sex-based nonsupport statute. The
court explained that, due to changing social conditions, courts "may no
longer arbitrarily assign roles and obligations upon the basis of gender." '94
While the conviction in Coleman was in violation of the sex-based deser-
tion and nonsupport statute, it is significant that the Maryland divorce
statute allowed alimony awards on the basis of need and not on the basis
of sex.95 The divorce statute thus conformed to the provisions of the ERA
while the criminal nonsupport statute did not. The Coleman court elimi-
nated this inconsistency96 by requiring a sex-neutral approach in the sup-
89. See Kurtz, supra note 24, at 133.
90. Id
91. 440 U.S. at 281-82.
92. Id at 281.
93. Id at 280.
94. 37 Md. App. at 325, 377 A.2d at 554.
95. The statute assigned the responsibility for alimony and spousal support on the basis
of financial need by specifying that, in order to receive alimony, it must appear from the
evidence that the "spouse's income is insufficient to care for his or her needs." MD. CODE
ANN. art. 16, § 5 (1976).
96. It was not logical that women who would be charged with the support responsibility
under the divorce statute could not be penalized for failure to carry out that responsibility
while men could be. See 37 Md. App. at 328-29, 377 A.2d at 554.
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port statute and by implicitly endorsing a case-by-case determination of
liability.
The Florida court's reasoning in Pfohl also embraced an individualized
approach to determine the relative financial circumstances of both partners
and to allocate the responsibility for spousal support after marriage. After
examining the financial needs and capabilities of both spouses, the court
accepted the lower court's determination that the wife was the sole pro-
vider of the couple's lavish lifestyle.97 The court also accepted the finding
that the husband needed temporary rehabilitative assistance in regaining
employment because, at the insistence of his wife, he had not worked for
over seven years during the marriage. The husband had suffered from a
mental disorder which, according to expert testimony, would require at
least a year of intensive psychotherapy.98 His physical good health and
previous work experience99 were, however, evidence that his incapacity
was only temporary and did not justify a permanent award. In harmony
with Orr, the gender of the parties was not a factor determining the par-
ties' financial needs and abilities. I°°
The equitable distribution of responsibilities undertaken in Pfohl, Cole-
man and Orr may encourage courts to award temporary support more
frequently for a spouse who has the ability to recover from the extended
loss of employment during marriage.'' After closely examining the facts
of each case, courts may be more likely to award rehabilitative alimony
because, under the equitable principles underlying Orr, they must recog-
nize that the husband's duty to his wife and children is neither exclusive
nor necessarily permanent. An approach of awarding rehabilitative ali-
mony ' 2 to either the male or female spouse would temporarily alleviate
the difficulties of a sudden separation while not imposing a lifelong duty
on either spouse."°3 Obviously, however, a court need not resort to such a
measure when a woman who has devoted a considerable portion of her
97. Pfohl v. Pfohl, 345 So. 2d 370, 376 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
98. Id at 376-77.
99. Id at 378.
100. For a critical comparison of rehabilitative alimony and lump sum awards to wives
and to husbands, see Cypen, Irving & Stephen, supra note 74, at 203.
101. See The Course of Change in Family Law 1978-79, [1979] 5 FAM. L. REP. (BNA)
4013, 4014.
102. Ideally, the rehabilitative alimony award would last "only for the period of time
necessary for the wife to adjust to her new status and circumstances." Erickson, Spousal
Support Toward the Realization of Educational Goals. How The Law Can Ensure Reciprocity,
1978 Wis. L. REV. 947, 951.
103. See, e.g., Dakin v. Dakin, 62 Wash. 2d 687, 384 P.2d 639, 642 (1963) (award of
temporary alimony to wife based on state's policy to place a duty upon wife to seek employ-
ment within a reasonable time after divorce).
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working years to being a wife and mother has no realistic possibility of
becoming financially independent." n An individual determination of
needs and abilities may reveal that the wife is able to provide for herself or
that she has training or a skill that may be revitalized. Through the de-
tailed analysis of the particular facts of each case, as mandated by Orr,
courts may realize that the historic need to protect all wives from the eco-
nomic consequences of divorce no longer rests on accurate assumptions.' 5
The Court's reasoning in Orr may in the future be extended to invali-
date sex-based child support statutes. While there has already been some
movement by state courts toward equalizing child support responsibili-
ties, 106 most states still impose the primary duty for child support on fa-
thers. ' 7 Since judicial hearings are routinely held to determine the
amount and conditions for child support and child custody, there is al-
ready a mechanism for ascertaining which parent is better able to meet the
children's financial needs upon divorce. For this reason, no important
state interest is served by making men primarily or solely responsible for
the economic welfare of their children on the assumption that women need
special protection because they are unprepared to meet their share of the
financial obligations. 08 Moreover, under the equal protection standard
that has evolved since Reed v. Reed, the administrative convenience of au-
tomatically making fathers responsible for support is not a governmental
interest sufficiently important to justify sex-based discrimination. 0 9 Nor,
as Orr confirmed, is promotion of a male-dominated family structure a
sufficiently important governmental objective."' If a state's intention to
104. See Erickson, supra note 37, at 49-50.
105. See generally Erickson, supra note 102; Note, supra note 17.
106. For example, in Plant v. Plant, 20 I11. App. 3d 5, 312 N.E.2d 847 (1974), the Appel-
late Court of Illinois refused to award retroactive support to a mother for expenditures she
made on behalf of her 17-year-old daughter. The court, rejecting the mother's contention
that the father is always primarily liable to provide child support, found that the obligation
was joint and several and stated that actual determination of support should be made on the
basis of the child's needs and the parents' respective income abilities. 312 N.E.2d at 849.
See also Spaulding v. Spaulding, 204 N.W.2d 634 (Iowa 1973) (both parents are liable for
child support in proportion to their ability to pay); Pennsylvania v. Baggs, 392 A.2d 720 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1978) (statute imposing penalty for willful neglect or refusal to support illegiti-
mate child applies to both parents).
107. See Freed & Foster, supra note 28, at 4034; Kurtz, supra note 24, at 145.
108. See Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977). See also text accompanying notes 45-
49. In Webster, equalization of the financial positions of men and women and compensa-
tion of women for past discrimination and economic disadvantages was an "important gov-
ernmental objective." See also Weiner, Child Support.: The Double Standard, 6 FLA. ST. L.
REV. 1317, 1335-39 (1978); Note supra note 47, at 205.
109. See notes 34-37 and accompanying text supra.
110. 440 U.S. at 268, 279-80.
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eliminate the effects of past sex discrimination is genuine, it could accom-
plish this goal by implementing a scheme of child support that would as-
sess each parent's financial abilities without relying on a sex-based
generalization. Thus, the sex-based classification used in most child sup-
port statutes should be held invalid because it unnecessarily "carries with
it the baggage of sexual stereotypes.""'
Similar to awards of child support, determinations of child custody have
long been based on sex-based presumptions rather than equitable consid-
erations. Originally, the custodial responsibility rested with the father be-
cause his children were regarded as his chattels. 1" 2 In twentieth-century
American law, however, child custody has been an almost exclusively fe-
male duty. 1 3 In general, courts endeavor to promote the "best interests"
of children of divorce" 4 by placing them with the parent better able to
care for them. Courts presume, however, that mothers are inherently bet-
ter parents than fathers and that, all things being equal, the mother should
be awarded custody.' Courts have most frequently invoked this mater-
nal preference rule when children of "tender years"' 16 have been the sub-
ject of custodial disputes.
The changing familial roles which significantly shaped judicial ap-
proaches to marital and child support"7 have also encouraged revision of
the sex-based maternal preference rule in child custody. Many states have
specifically discarded the tender-years doctrine, and several have statuto-
rily equalized child custody laws regardless of the child's age." 8 Sex-
based criteria for determining child custody have been successfully at-
tacked under state ERA's" 9 and, in New York, have been held unconstitu-
11L. Id at 283.
112. See M. ROMAN & W. HADDAD, THE DISPOSABLE PARENT 25 (1978); Kurtz, supra
note 24, at 136; Orthner & Lewis, Evidence of Single-Father Competence in Childrearing, 13
FAM. L.Q. 27 (1979).
113. In approximately 90% of contested custody cases, mothers are awarded custody of
their children. M. ROMAN & W. HADDAD, supra note 112, at 23.
114. See Kurtz, supra note 24, at 138; Comment, The Father's Right to Child Custody in
Interparental Disputes, 49 TuL. L. REV. 189 (1974).
115. See Note, Maternal Preference and the Double Burden. Best Interest of Whom?, 38
LA. L. REV. 1096 (1978).
116. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Jenkins, 173 Wis. 592, 181 N.W. 826 (1921). See also Freed &
Foster, Lfe With Father, 11 FAM. L.Q. 321, 329-40 (1978).
117. See notes 27-29 supra.
118. Thirty states have rejected the tender years doctrine while 10 states have statutorily
"de-sexed" child custody. Freed & Foster, supra note 28, at 4035-36.
119. See, e.g., King v. Vancil, 34 Ill. App. 3d 831, 341 N.E.2d 65 (1975); Pennsylvania ex
rel. Spriggs v. Carson, 470 Pa. 290, 368 A.2d 635 (1977). But see Arends v. Arends, 30 Utah
2d 328, 517 P.2d 1019 (1974).
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tional on equal protection grounds. 2° In jurisdictions still adhering to
gender-based presumptions, Orr is likely to be a catalyst for change.' 2'
Similar to the historical presumption that men are better able financially
to support their families, the presumption that women are better able to
rear children is a conclusion based on stereotypic generalizations.
22
Under the equal protection analysis of Orr, such generalizations cannot
withstand constitutional scrutiny because no legitimate state interest justi-
fies the sex-based distinction. The maternal preference rule was justified
on the grounds that caring for children was properly the domain of wo-
men. As men increasingly assume more responsibility for the care of their
children, this rationale is less frequently valid.
Of the possible state interests which might justify the maternal prefer-
ence rule, compensating women for the effects of past discrimination is not
applicable. Awarding custody to mothers does not effectively lessen the
burdens that divorced or separated women face. 123 The rule is also incon-
sistent with the standard of equal protection presently applied to sex-based
classifications since, after Reed v. Reed, 24 it is unlikely that the adminis-
trative convenience of automatically awarding women child custody in
contested cases would be found to be a sufficiently important state interest
justifying a sex-based classification. Finally, the support and custody pro-
ceedings provide the opportunity to analyze each party's child-rearing
qualifications and to devise an appropriate custodial arrangement in the
best interests of the child.
25
In the aftermath of Orr, the responsibility for alimony and child support
is shifting from an exclusively male duty to a shared obligation. Hope-
fully, the courts will be influenced by Orr in custody cases and will replace
the maternal preference rule with a more individualized determination.
120. In New York ex rel. Watts v. Watts, 77 Misc. 2d 178, 350 N.Y.S.2d 285 (Fam. Ct.
1973), the court used a standard of strict scrutiny to invalidate the tender years presumption,
noting that it is "actually a blanket judicial finding of fact ... that, until proven otherwise
by the weight of substantial evidence, mothers are always better suited to care for young
children than fathers." Id at 287.
121. See Freed & Foster, supra note 28, at 4035-36.
122. See New York exrel. Watts v. Watts, 77 Misc. 2d 178, 350 N.Y.S.2d 285, 289 (Fam.
Ct. 1973). See also Orthner & Lewis, supra note 112, at 27.
123. Though the custodial parent is not charged with a separate financial support obliga-
tion, divorced mothers are today likely to work outside the home while assuming their custo-
dial duties. See M. ROMAN & W. HADDAD, supra note 112; THE SUBTLE REVOLUTION,
supra note 27, at 9, 11. See also Erickson, supra note 37, at 46; Comment, supra note 114, at
199; Note, supra note 115, at 1099.
124. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
125. For a discussion of the arguments in favor of joint custody, see M. ROMAN & W.
HADDAD, supra note 112.
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Under the equitable principles of Orr, the emphasis in determining famil-
ial duties should now be on the individual rather than the class.
IV. CONCLUSION
The insulation of women from the rights and responsibilities granted to
men has shielded wives and mothers from the duty of providing financial
support to their husbands and children. By applying the fourteenth
amendment's equal protection clause to strike down sex-based discrimina-
tion, courts have recognized women as equals for the purposes of receiving
benefits previously granted only to men. Recently, women have also been
recognized by courts as equals for the purposes of assuming responsibili-
ties previously imposed only on men. This trend responds to the growing
financial capabilities of women and heralds the beginning of a genuinely
equitable approach to alimony, child support, and child custody determi-
nations. The new approach to assessing familial responsibilities requires
that women be treated individually in their roles as spouses and as parents:
the actual needs and abilities of the parties, instead of their gender, should
be determinative factors. Given the capabilities of the family courts to
weigh these considerations, this individualized approach is a just and effec-
tive method of accommodating the new roles and abilities of women.
Under such an approach, outmoded assumptions hopefully will be re-
placed by equitable assessments of rights and responsibilities for men and
women alike.
Agnes Pek Dover
[Vol. 29:733
